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I. INTRODUCTION: 2007 A CRITICAL TURNING POINT?
History will judge whether the year 2007 was a turning point in the
European Union's policy towards a new commitment to meet the
compelling challenges of creating a competitive market in the EU
(Lisbon), climate change (Kyoto) and of securing sustainable energy
resources (Moscow). The title of the paper links three major policy
areas which have been brought together in 2007 in an exotic triangle.
Underlying each policy are a number of tensions which could ulti-
mately lead to the policies conflicting and running against each
other.
The Spring 2007 European Council called upon the Member States
and EU Institutions to pursue a policy in order to develop a sustain-
able integrated European climate and energy policy:
Given that energy production and use are the main
sources for greenhouse gas emissions, an integrated ap-
proach to climate and energy policy is needed to realise
this objective. Integration should be achieved in a mutu-
ally supportive way. With this in mind, the Energy Policy
for Europe (EPE) will pursue the following three objec-
tives, fully respecting Member States' choice of energy
mix and sovereignty over primary energy sources and
underpinned by a spirit of solidarity amongst Member
States:
- increasing security of supply;
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-ensuring the competitiveness of European economies
and the availability of affordable energy;
-promoting environmental sustainability and combating
climate change. 1
The European Council supported a comprehensive Energy Action
Plan 2007-2009, inviting the Commission to submit proposals to
implement the plan as quickly as possible. A firm commitment was
made for the EU to achieve at least a 20% reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions by the year 2020, compared to the year 1990; to in-
crease energy efficiency in the EU in order to achieve the objective
of saving 20% of the EU's energy consumption compared to projec-
tions for 2020; and, importantly, endorsed a binding target of a 20%
share of renewable energies in overall EU energy consumption by
2020 as well as a 10% binding minimum target to be achieved by all
Member States for the share of bio-fuels in overall EU transport pet-
rol and diesel consumption by 2020.2 The Member States are
obliged to adopt and aim to achieve an overall national indicative
energy savings target of 9% over 9 years.3 .
The Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007, promotes en-
ergy issues as a prime focus of EU policy. In the Reform Treaty,
Energy is addressed in Title XVI, Article 176a. This is a new clause
and new words (here in italics) are inserted into existing EC Treaty
provisions.
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of
the internal market and with regard for the need to pre-
serve and improve the environment, Union policy on en-
ergy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between the Mem-
ber States, to:
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
1. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (Mar. 9, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/
93135.pdf.
2. Cf Richard Doornbosch and Ronald Steenblick, Biofuels: Is the Cure
Worse Than the Disease?, OECD Round Table on Sustainable Development,
SG/ST/RT (2007) 3, available at http://media.ft.com/cms/fb8b5078-5fdb-lldc-
b0fe-0000779fd2ac.pdf.
3. Council Directive 2006/32, 10, 12, 2006 O.J. (L 114) 64.
[VOL. XIX
2009] LISBON, KYOTO, MOSCOW. JOINING THE DOTS 289
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provi-
sions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure, shall establish the measures necessary in
order to attain the objectives referred to in paragraph 1.
These measures shall be adopted after consultation of the
Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social
Committee.
Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to
determine the conditions for exploiting its energy re-
sources, its choice between different energy sources and
the general structure of its energy supply, without preju-
dice to Article 175(2)(c ).
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council,
acting in accordance with a special legislative proce-
dure, shall unanimously and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament, establish the measures referred to
therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature.
A new development in the Lisbon liberalisation process is the in-
creasing dependence of Western Europe upon gas supplies from
Russia in the context of unstable oil prices. A quarter of the EU's gas
as well as quarter of its oil originates from Russia.
The EC Commission has introduced a new strand to liberalisation by
developing a European strategy for sustainable, competitive and se-
cure energy which has a new external relations dimension. A Green
Paper was issued on 8 March 2006, and an external energy policy
paper was prepared by the EC Commission with the High Represen-
tative, Javier Solana, for the European Summit in Brussels in June
2006. 4
4. Commission Communication, A European Strategy for Sustainable,
Competitive and Secure Energy, COM (2006) 105 final (Mar. 8, 2006); Javier
Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
Address at the EU Energy Conference: Towards an EU External Energy Policy
(Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/ pressdata/
EN/discours/91788.pdf.
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Under the proposals of the Commission restrictive rules will apply
to non-EU companies wishing to buy a stake in the EU energy mar-
kets; foreign buyers who wish to purchase an EU network will have
to follow the same unbundling requirements as the EU's own firms.
In practice, third countries as well as their individuals should not be
able to acquire control over an EU transmission network unless there
is agreement between the EU bloc and the companies' country of
origin. This has become known as the "Gazprom Clause" but Com-
missioner Barroso has refused to label the safeguards as protection-
ism: "This is about fairness; it is about protecting fair competition. It
is not about protectionism".
5
II. THE INTERNAL CHALLENGES
A. Some Basics
The EU comprises 27 Member States. The EU has limited compe-
tence to act in the field of energy policy and environmental policy
and this competence has to be triggered. Agreement is reached by
long processes of bargaining, negotiation and compromise. Addi-
tionally, EU intervention must respect the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality. The recent enlargement of the EU in 2004 and
2007 has created wider divisions on policy matters and new tensions
on environmental policies. The classic North-South divide of the EU
now has four axis as divisions between East-West emerge. 6 Thus, at
5. Jos6 Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, Energising
Europe: a real market with secure supply, Opening remarks at press conference on
the Commission's energy package (Sept. 19, 2007), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECHI07/553&forma
t=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
6. Current issues concern how the overall targets set by the EU should be
distributed amongst the Member States, different attitudes towards environment
policies as a result of the different economic situations in each Member State,
differences in research and development and how to compensate for higher costs
often associated with the use of environmentally-friendly products. See Press
Release, European Commission, European citizens in favour of a European En-
ergy policy, says Eurobarometer survey (Jan. 24, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/66&format=HTM
L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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best, EU responses to political, economic and social issues tend to-
wards compromise and fragmentation.
The wave of liberalisation which spread across Europe during the
1990s 7 changed the economic dimension of the regulation of the
environment and energy supplies as well as the legal and political
power structures as to where the responsibility lies in achieving more
environmentally friendly policies and ensuring security of supply.
The external relations policy of the EU, including neighbourhood
policies with contiguous states, 8 turns this into a complicated exer-
cise in achieving a coherent policy within the EU towards renewable
energy sources.
9
In global terms the EU occupies a small land mass which is
densely populated. In the context of the strategy on the environment
and renewable energy sources this has an impact in at least two di-
mensions. Firstly, despite the recent enlargements, the EU is geo-
graphically small in terms of land area, but relatively densely popu-
lated when compared with say Australia, Brazil, Canada, the Russian
Federation and the US. Yet land is a crucial resource for the devel-
opment of a renewable energy strategy and the EU has set itself a
number of ambitious targets against a legal culture of protecting
7. See ERIKA SZYSZCZAK, THE REGULATION OF THE STATE IN COMPETITIVE
MARKETS IN THE EU, chs. 1, 5 (Hart 2007).
8. For example, the "Energy Community" is a process which aims to extend
the EU Internal Market rules to South Eastern Europe through the Treaty Estab-
lishing the Energy Community, Oct. 25, 2005, 2006 O.J. (L 198) 18 [hereinafter
ENC Treaty], available at http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/
ENCHOME/ENERGYCOMMUNITY/Legal/Treaty. Preceding the ENC Treaty
was the Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 31, 1994, O.J. (L 380) 24 [hereinafter ECC
Treaty], available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/userupload/document/
EN.pdf#page=141. The ECC Treaty has been signed or acceded to by fifty-one
states plus the European Communities. The Treaty was developed on the basis of
the Energy Charter Declaration of 1991. Whereas the latter document was drawn
up as a declaration of political intent to promote energy cooperation, the Energy
Charter Treaty is a legally-binding multilateral instrument. The fundamental aim
of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by
creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating govern-
ments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-related investments and
trade.
9. See SANAM HAGHIGHI, ENERGY SECURITY: THE EXTERNAL LEGAL
RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH MAJOR OIL AND GAS SUPPLYING
COUNTRIES (2007).
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property rights.' 0 Secondly, within the political discourse of the EU,
questions are being raised as to why Europeans should bear the brunt
of higher taxes and prices in order to engage with renewable energy
strategies. There is a sharp divide between "east" and "west" or
"old" and "new" Europe, with a mood of cynicism developing at the
local level. The response at the EU has been to stress the need for a
global response to the issue of renewable energy.
B. Competence Issues
Previously the creation of an EU renewable energy policy strad-
dled two major policy areas of the EU: environmental policy and
energy policy. Both policy areas must co-exist with the fundamental
economic constitutional provisions of the Internal Market and Com-
petition Law policy and the Lisbon process which attempts a regen-
eration of the EU to make it the most competitive, dynamic, knowl-
edge-based society by the year 2010.
In recent years a major issue for mediating EU competence dis-
putes has been how to balance the priority given to economic inte-
gration issues in the original EEC Treaty and policies in the early
years with the growing acceptance of a wider set of social and fun-
damental rights values, recognised by the political community and
the European Courts. The emphasis upon a wider range of social
values has also begun to create new tensions between the balancing
of these policies against or with each other, with environmental con-
cerns impacting upon a number of the new policies."
C. Environmental Policy
The beginning of a coherent EU environmental policy is usually
traced back to the Paris Summit of 1972 when the Heads of State or
Government committed the EU to developing the social dimension
of economic integration.' 2 The fact that environmental concerns
10. This legal culture is better known as "NIMBYism" (Not In My Back
Yard!).
11. MARIA LEE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CHALLENGES, CHANGE AND
DECISION-MAKING (2005).
12. Communique, First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community, Oct.
21, 1972, Bulletin EC 10-1972, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1919/02/
paris_1972_communique.pdf. Prior to this the EEC had adopted ad hoc legisla-
tion which had an environmental dimension, for example, Council Directive
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were an EU social issue is reflected in the external pressures to rec-
ognise environmental concerns as an aspect of international co-
operation, starting with the 1972 UN Conference on the Human En-
vironment in Stockholm. From 1973 onwards a series on Environ-
mental Action Plans were drawn up. 13 It was not until the Single
European Act 1987 that a clear legal base for an environmental pol-
icy for the EU was introduced. 14 This coincided with the Court de-
claring that environmental protection was "one of the Community's
essential objectives." 15 The 1980s saw a new pace to addressing
environmental issues both within, and outside of the EU and a grow-
ing advocacy for environmental concerns. 
16
The legal base for an EU environmental policy is Article 175 of
the EC Treaty, which allows for the adoption of the Action Plans and
legislation. 17  Article 176 of the EC Treaty allows the Member
States to maintain or introduce more stringent measures than the
measures at EU level under Article 175 EC. 18 Article 6 of the
Treaty, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, creates a con-
stitutional mainstreaming principle that environmental protection
67/548, 1967 O.J. (L 196) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31967L0548:EN:NOT.
13. The most recent is the Sixth Environmental Plan which covers the period
2002 - 2012. Commission Communication on the Sixth Environment Action Pro-
gramme of the European Community, "Environment 2010: Our future, Our
choice," COM (2001) 31 final (Jan. 24, 2001), available at http://www.ff3.hu/
upload/6_actionplan-en.pdf.
14. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, available at
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%/20documents/SEA/Single
%20European%20Act.pdf. Prior to this Article 94 and Article 308 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community were used as the legal base for environ-
mental measures. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf.
15. Case 240/83, Procureur de la R~publique v. ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. 531
(1983).
16. Damian Chalmers, Environmental Protection and the Single Market: An
Unsustainable Development. Does the EC Treaty Need a Title on the Environment,
1 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 65 (1985); DAMIAN CHALMERS,
INHABITANTS IN THE FIELD OF EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, IN THE EVOLUTION OF
EU LAW (Paul Craig and Graine DeBfirca eds., 1999).
17. EC Treaty, supra note 14. Legislation is usually adopted using the co-
decision procedure except for areas -covered by Article 175(2), which include
measures of a fiscal nature and measures affecting town and country planning. Id.
18. Id. at art. 176.
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requirements must be mainstreamed into the definition and imple-
mentation of all Community policies, in particular with a view to
promoting sustainable development. 19
A new dimension to EU environmental policy was introduced at
the European Council in Gothenburg 2001. This was the Sustainable
Development Strategy which added an environmental dimension to
the Lisbon Process. The EU Sixth Action Programme (2002-2010)
Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice aims to implement this
new strand of the Lisbon Agenda but it has been criticised for being
too strategic without having clear and attainable objectives and time
frames, focusing upon co-operation and agreement and less on cen-
tralised EU enforcement. This new dimension may be challenged by
changes in the new Treaty of Lisbon.
By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in ac-
cordance with a special legislative procedure, shall unanimously
and after consulting the European Parliament, establish the measures
referred to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature.
D. Energy
1. Liberalisation and the Lack of a Competitive Energy Market
2 1
In contrast to other sectors opened up to competition the liberalisa-
tion of the energy sector has been slow, and has met with resistance
from some of the Member States. Once viewed as essentially local
industries providing essential services, the energy utilities sector
now finds itself subject to greater cross-border trade and a growing
interest by foreign capital in national utilities. Since the period after
the First World War, ideas of international regulation of utilities
have been on the international agenda, but there has also been a
countervailing tendency towards national protectionism to protect
19. Id. at art. 6. This has been implemented by soft law processes, most nota-
bly the Cardiff Process from 1998 which requires the different sectors to develop
appropriate environmental strategies.
20. Commission Communication, A Sustainable Future for a Better World. A
European Strategy for Sustainable Development, COM (2001) 264 final, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0264en01 .pdf,
The Sixth Environmental Plan, supra note 13.
21. See SzyszczAK, supra note 7, at 164.
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security of supply.22 Such forms of protection would take the form
of the creation of national monopolies, exclusive rights and conces-
sions, legal restrictions on energy imports and exports, rules limiting
foreign ownership of essential energy providers and measures fa-
vouring the procurement of domestic energy resources over foreign
resources. The organisation of a vital element of production along
national lines, regulated by the state, created a number of adverse
barriers for the European integration project. The demand for energy
supplies and the need for cross-border coordination of energy poli-
cies in the post-war reconstruction of Europe is seen in the creation
of the ECSC and Euratom, but the EEC Treaty did not include provi-
sions for a common energy policy. 23 It was not until the oil crisis of
the 1970s that policy-makers were aware of Europe's increased de-
pendence upon imported supplies of energy, and this focused atten-
tion on the need for common policies as the Member States intro-
duced even more protectionist national policies.
24
Liberalisation in the energy sector has been much slower and more
piecemeal than in the telecommunications and the postal sectors. The
EC Commission did not apply the competition rules in the energy
sector and attempts to liberalise this sector were met with resistance
from the Member States, alongside internal squabbles within the
Commission between the Internal Market and Competition Director-
ates over jurisdiction.
The first stages of liberalisation took place between 1989 and
1995. The United Kingdom was the first Member State partially to
privatise its electricity industry. Other Member States were reluctant
to privatise, mainly because of issues of securing supplies in an es-
sential sector. However during this initial period the idea that pro-
duction and distribution of electricity was a natural monopoly was
turned on its head as the state electricity monopolies were divided
into smaller parts, comprising electricity generation, high voltage
22. See Martha Roggenkamp, Implications of GATT and EEC on Network-
bound Trade in Europe, 12 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 59 (1994).
23. N. J. D. LUCAS, ENERGY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 14 (Europa
Press 1977).
24. See J. Hassan and A. Duncan, Integrating Energy: the Problems of Devel-
oping an Energy Policy in the European Communities, 23 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 159
(1994); E Schumacher, The Struggle for a European Energy Policy, 2 J. COMMON
MKT. STUDIES 199 (1964).
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transmission systems, local distribution systems and retail to the fi-
nal consumer.
The Single European Act 1987 provided the EC Commission with
a new objective and a legal base from which to pursue a Community
policy on energy. The EC Commission used a Working Document to
set out its policies, and submitted a framework and set of common
rules for the completion of the Internal Market in gas and electricity
in February 1992.25 The EC Commission identified the use of na-
tional grid networks as an obstacle to realising an Internal Market in
26
energy.
The initial liberalisation proposal used Article 86(3) EC as the le-
gal base. The Member States were unwilling to accept these propos-
als, even for partial opening up of the energy sector. They were con-
cerned with the lack of protection for services of general economic
interest and also how far they could take measures to ensure security
of supply. Subsequent Treaty amendments allowed the EU to take
greater control over an energy liberalisation policy. The EU 1993
added Article 3(t) EC which lists measures in the spheres of energy,
civil protection and tourism to the Community's common policies
and activities, and Article 129b EC on trans-European networks. The
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, in what is Article 16 EC, recognised the
role of services of general economic interest in the integration proc-
ess.
The lack of an Energy Charter or Chapter in the EC Treaty is often
blamed for the lack of any Community-level progress in the energy
sector in the 1990s. 27 The rules of the EC Treaty applies to the en-
25. Commission Working Document on The Internal Energy Market, COM
(88) 238 final (May 2, 1988), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/4037/
01/000179_l.pdf; 1992 O.J. (C 65) 4. These proposed the abolition of special and
exclusive rights to open up markets; the unbundling or administrative separation of
the functions of production, transmission, distribution and supply; a qualified, but
compulsory, obligation on owners of transmission and distribution grids to offer
access to third parties in return for reasonable compensation (the idea of access in
a regulated manner to an "essential facility").
26. Commission Communication on Electricity and Natural Gas Transmission
Infrastructures in the Community, SEC (92) 533 final (Mar. 27, 1992), available
at http://aei.pitt.edu/4818/01/000973 l.pdf.
27. Commission Green Paper: For a European Union Energy Policy, COM
(94) 659 final (Feb. 23, 1995), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/
1185/01/energygpCOM 94 659.pdf.; Cf. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Role of the
European Commission as Regards National Energy Policies, 12 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 342, 346-47 (1994).
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ergy sector, 28 but the tight reins of control at the national level left
little room for opportunistic litigation to challenge the way the na-
tional monopolies were run, thus the application of the free move-
ment and competition rules has been problematic. 29 The Member
States won an important point of principle in the Campus Oil rul-
ing.30 Oil companies challenged an order requiring that at least 35
per cent of their supplies of oil should be acquired at pre-determined
prices from the state-owned monopoly in Ireland. The Irish govern-
ment claimed that without this security of orders the refinery would
not be viable and Ireland would be dependent upon imported sup-
plies of oil and other petroleum products. The Court accepted that
the order was contrary to Article 28 EC, but could be justified by
reference to Article 30 EC. Although measures had been taken at the
Community level to respond to the oil crisis of the 1970s, the Court
accepted that these were not sufficient to give a Member State 'un-
conditional assurance that supplies will in any event be maintained at
least at a level sufficient to meet minimum needs.' 
31
The Court ruled that a Member State may rely upon Article 30 EC
to justify 'appropriate complementary measures' even where such
measures would involve elements of economic policy not normally
permitted under Article 30 EC. 32 The case was interpreted as allow-
ing the Member States a wide latitude over securing energy supplies
and protecting national industry from the full rigours of the free
movement (Internal Market) and competition rules. However, the
Court insisted that the Member States must satisfy the proportional-
ity principle and show why restrictive measures are necessary. The
Court held that the exclusive rights to import and market gas and
electricity granted to state monopolies could infringe Article 31 EC,
and the EC Commission used this tool to bring infringement actions
28. See, e.g., LEIGH HANCHER, EC ELECTRICITY LAW (Chancery 1992); Leigh
Hancher, EC State Aids and Energy, 2 O.G.T.L.R. 62 (1995); Piet Jan Slot, En-
ergy and Competition, 31 C.M.L.R. 511 (1994).
29. See, e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 14 at art. 81(3) (allowing an individual
exemption for a restrictive agreement in which German electricity undertakings
and industrial producers should purchase a specific amount of German produced
coal, which was supported through subsidies, when less expensive coal could be
obtained from outside Germany, 1993 O.J. (L 50) 14).
30. Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. & others v. Minister of Indus. & Energy &
others, 1984 E.C.R. 2727.
31. Id. 31.
32. Id. 36.
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against energy monopolies. In Greek Oil Monopoly the EC Commis-
sion brought an infringement action challenging the natural oil refin-
ery monopoly and its exclusive import and commercial rights. 3 The
Court held that the Greek government had not shown that without
these restrictive rights the refineries would not be able to compete on
the market. 34 Frustrated by the lack of progress towards even partial
liberalisation of the energy sector the EC Commission brought in-
fringement actions against Spain, The Netherlands, Italy and
France. 35 In the case against Spain the EC Commission argued that
the combination of legislative provisions conferred exclusive import
and export rights on Redesa. This action was dismissed for lack of
proof. The case against The Netherlands concerned the import ban
on electricity; electricity intended for public distribution could be
imported only by the designated company (SEP). The case against
Italy concerned measures which reserved import and export of elec-
tricity to the state monopoly, ENEL. The case against France con-
cerned the measures reserving import and export of natural gas to
Gaz de France and two other concessionaires. The EC Commission
alleged that the exclusive rights were contrary to Articles 28 and 31
EC.
The Court examined the application of Article 31 EC first, con-
cluding that the rights were in conflict with this provision. It was
thus not necessary to examine the application of Article 28 EC. The
Court then went on to discuss the applicability of Article 86(2) EC.36
This was a bold move since it had been assumed since the Campus
Oil judgment that Article 86(2) EC could not be read across in this
way to provide a derogation from the free movement rules. 37 The
Court was generous, stating that the Member States could take na-
tional policy objectives into account when defining a service of gen-
eral economic interest, and that through necessity the state monopo-
33. Case C-347/88, Commission v. Greece, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4747.
34. Id.
35. Case C-157/94, Commission v. Netherlands, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5699; Case C-
158/94, Commission v. Italy, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5789; Case C-159/94, Commission v.
France, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5815; Case C-160/94, Commission v. Spain, 1997 E.C.R. I-
5851.
36. Note that the Court does not discuss the possibility of reading across the
justifications found in Article 30 of the EC Treaty into Article 31. EC Treaty,
supra note 14. Cf Commission v. Greece, supra note 33.
37. Supra note 30.
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lies must be able to perform the tasks assigned to them under eco-
nomically viable conditions. 38 The threat of further intervention by
the EC Commission persuaded the Member States to adopt liberali-
sation directives, using what is now Article 95 EC, the Internal Mar-
ket legal base.39
The first move to create a set of common rules liberalising the en-
ergy sector 40 allowed the Member States to liberalise their energy
sectors at a different pace, resulting in an even more fragmented en-
ergy market. 4 1 The use of informalfora for regulatory coordination
was a new dimension to liberalisation whereby the Electricity Regu-
latory Forum (The Florence Forum/Process) and the Gas Regulatory
Forum (The Madrid Forum/Process) were created by the EC Com-
mission Directorate-General in charge of energy. The gas and elec-
tricity markets evolved in different ways and are different. Gas is a
primary energy source and is capable of being stored, but is depend-
ent upon large-scale investments in infrastructure (pipelines, for ex-
ample) and the market is dominated by large, non-EU suppliers. To
remedy these effects a new package of measures was adopted and
became operational on July 1, 2004 for electricity and July 1, 2006
38. "{T}hese judgements-by maintaining certain monopolies-seem to her-
ald the end of an era of progressive development towards a more market-oriented
economy in the Community." Piet Jan Slot, Comment: Cases C-157/94, Commis-
sion v Netherlands; C-158/94 Commission v Italy; Case 159/94 Commission v
France; C-160/94 Commission v Spain; C-189/95. Harry Franzdn; judgments of
23 October 1997, Full Court, [1997] ECR 1-5699, 5789, 1-5815, 1-5851, 1-5909,
35 C.M.L.R. 1183, 1202 (1998); See also Piet Jan Slot, Energy (Electricity and
Natural Gas), in THE LIBERALISATION OF STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND BEYOND (Damien Geradin ed., Kluwer 2000).
39. See DONIMIQUE FINON & ATLE MIDTTUN, RESHAPING EUROPEAN GAS AND
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRIES (Elsevier Science 2004).
40. Council Directive 96/92, 1997 O.J. (L 27) 20 (concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity); Council Directive 98/30, 1997 O.J. (L 27) 20
(concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas); Council Direc-
tive 94/22, 1994 O.J. (L 1164) 3, 54 (on the conditions for granting and using
authorizations for the prospecting, exploration and production of hydrocarbons).
41. The use of subsidiarity was justified given the divergent resource bases,
legal structure, industry structure and policy choices. See PETER CAMERON,
COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS (Oxford University Press 2002); Commission
Communication on Completing the Internal Energy Market, COM (2001) 125
fmal.
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for gas. 42 The EC Commission has also adopted a number of non-
binding interpretative documents to accompany the Directives.
The package created a more detailed framework for the regulation
of the energy market,43 introduced new concepts,44 and increased the
role of NRAs alongside enhanced monitoring and reporting require-
ments for the Member States.45 The Directives have two main aims:
to increase quantitative market opening in order to achieve full liber-
alisation and to enhance qualitative regulation to increase consumer
choice through uniformity and coordination of the Member States'
energy markets.
Access to the gas and electricity networks was, and continues to be,
a major issue in the liberalisation process. In the first set of liberali-
sation Directives the Member States were allowed a choice between
negotiated and regulated third party access to the networks. This did
not work and the EU soon realised that some Member States, such as
Germany, enjoyed a strategic position in the energy trade which dis-
torted the liberalisation processes in other states. Now, to secure
competition in the wholesale market in the energy sector, the Mem-
ber States must ensure that third party access to transmission and
distribution is based upon published tariffs, applicable to all eligible
customers, and is based upon an objective and non-discriminatory
system. The NRA must approve the tariffs (or the methodology) in
advance. Article 20(2) of Directive 2003/54/EC allows refusal of
access where there is no available capacity. But conditions are at-
tached to this refusal. Substantiated reasons must be given, taking
into account any public service obligations, and the Member States
must ensure that the transmission system operator or distribution
42. Council Directive 2003/54, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 37 (concerning common
rules for the intemal market in electricity and repealing Council Directive 96/92);
Council Directive 2003/55, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 57 (concerning common rules for
the internal market in natural gas and repealing Council Directive 98/30).
43. Gone is the flexibility of the earlier programme. Both Directives had to be
implemented by the Member States by July 1, 2004. By this date there had to be
freedom of choice for non-domestic customers with all customers enjoying free-
dom of choice by July 1, 2007. There are some derogations, but these are defined
as narrow in scope. See Council Directives, supra note 42.
44. E.g., enhanced consumer protection, universal service obligations, supplier
of last resorts, green labeling and compliance programmes. See Council Direc-
tives, supra note 42.
45. The Gas Directive is less interventionist relying more heavily on the Ma-
drid Forum.
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system operator provides relevant information on measures that
would be necessary to reinforce the network. Exemptions may also
be given where there are major new infrastructure projects or signifi-
cant increases in capacity in existing inter connectors.
In contrast, in the gas sector, third party access to transmission and
distribution networks is to be provided on the basis of published and
regulated tariffs, but for storage facilities access is to be on either a
negotiated or regulated basis (or both). Access to upstream pipeline
networks is to be separated out and Member States are given discre-
tion over the arrangements adopted. Exemptions may be given for
major new gas infrastructure investments.
Unbundling of vertically integrated undertakings addresses the
structural constraints of the networks in three ways: legal unbun-
dling, functional unbundling and accounting unbundling. Legal un-
bundling separates the transmission system operator and distribution
system operator from other activities not related to transmission and
distribution. Transmission and distribution are to be carried out by a
separate network undertaking with a legal form chosen by the verti-
cally integrated undertaking. Functional unbundling involves a sepa-
ration of the transmission system operator and distribution system
operator to ensure its independence from the vertically integrated
undertaking. Accounting unbundling provides that separate accounts
should be drawn up for network activities relating to electricity and
gas.
A significant change in the new Directives is stronger commit-
ments to the public service obligation (also known as the universal
service obligation in the liberalisation Directives of the EU). This is
seen as a fundamental requirement in the Recitals to each Directive.
In the Electricity Directive there is a right to a universal service,
which is the right of all households46 to be supplied with electricity
of a specified quantity within the territory of the Member State at
reasonable, easily and clearly comparable and transparent prices. A
similar obligation is not found in the Gas Directive. Alongside the
universal service requirements are strengthened consumer protection
rights covering the handling of complaints, protection against mis-
leading selling and unfair contract terms.
46. Council Directive 2003/54, supra note 42. Member States have a discre-
tion to extend this obligation for small and medium-sized enterprises.
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Cross-border trade in the electricity sector is regulated by Com-
mission Regulation 1228/2003 which entered into force on July 1,
2004.47 This is an Internal Market measure, based upon Article
95(1) of the EC Treaty.48 It builds upon the work of the Electricity
Regulatory Forum to increase cross-border trade through increased
harmonisation of tariffs and charges. The Regulation uses inter-
transmission systems and operators' compensation mechanisms to
compensate for costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border
flows of electricity on their networks by transmission systems opera-
tors from which those flows originate and the systems where they
end. It encourages consistent charging for network access by outlaw-
ing "pancaking" 49 and distance-related charges, thereby avoiding
distortions of trade. Finally it sets out general measures to improve
capacity allocation including congestion management. In contrast
there is a significant amount of cross-border trade in gas, and here
the regulation focuses upon third party access to networks.
The new Directives created a different regulatory culture, setting
out minimum requirements and creating new obligations for regula-
tory bodies at the national level. Part of this new role is an obligation
to coordinate horizontally, at a trans-national level, as well as at the
vertical level with the EC Commission. In 2003 the EC Commission
established an independent European Regulators' Group for Electric-
ity and Gas. The Directives created regulatory committees governed
by the comitology procedure. The NRAs are to ensure non-
discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of
the market. Competition authorities may also play a role in the liber-
alisation process. There is a requirement in the Electricity Directive
that each Member State must provide a report to the EC Commission
by 31 July each year on market dominance, predatory and anti-
competitive behaviour.
47. 2003 O.J. (L176) 1.
48. Supra note 14.
49. "Pancaking" is the accumulation of tariffs to be paid by a shipper on en-
ergy transactions between two locations using two or more transmission system
operators with their own set of tariffs.
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2. Post-Liberalisation: a New Energy Policy
In its Report on the internal market for electricity and gas, adopted
in November 2005,50 the EC Commission identified the delay in
applying the 2003 Gas and Electricity Directives as one of the main
causes for the shortcomings in the European internal energy market.
Not all of the Member States are at fault, and in Austria, The Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom liberalisation is advanced. However,
in other states there are problems in adapting deep-seated features of
the national energy market to the liberalisation process. For example,
France continues to attach importance to public security issues and
the provision by the state of public service obligations; in Germany
ex ante regulation is difficult to reconcile with the preference for the
market mechanism. 51 Infringement actions were taken against Esto-
nia, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Luxembourg in 2005,52 and in 2006
infringement proceedings were commenced against 17 Member
States for failure fully to implement the Energy Liberalisation Direc-
tives.53
Within the context of the revived Lisbon Process, 54 and in re-
sponse to growing concerns voiced by consumers over significant
price rises in 2004 and 200555 and complaints from new entrants
unable fully to access grids, the EC Commission launched an inquiry
into the competitiveness of the EU energy sector on 13 June 2005.
This was initiated by a Communication from the Commissioner for
Competition (Neelie Kroes), in agreement with the Commissioner
for Energy (Andris Piebalgs), 56 and the adoption of a Decision pur-
suant to the EC Commission's powers under Article 17 of Council
50. Commission Sector Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003
EC in the European electricity and gas markets, COMP/B- 1/39172, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comnVcompetition/sectors/energy/inquiry/communication-en.p
df.
51. See MARTHA ROGGENKAMP, EUROPEAN ENERGY LAW REPORT III (Martha
Roggenkamp ed., Intersentia 2006).
52. Press Release, European Commission, IP/06/853 (July 6, 2005).
53. Press Release, European Commission, IP/06/430 (Apr. 4 2006); Press
Release, European Commission, IP/06/1768 (Dec. 12, 2006).
54. Commission Communication to the Spring European Council-Working
Together For Growth and Jobs-A New Start for the Lisbon Agenda at 8, 19 COM
(2005) 24 final (Feb. 2, 2005).
55. See Commission Sector Inquiry: Energy Sector, Nov. 11, 2005, available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector-inquiries/energy/
issuespaperl5 112005.pdf.
56. See Commission Sector Inquiry, supra note 50.
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Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. The preliminary findings of the inquiry
were published in February 2006. 57 Five major obstacles to competi-
tiveness were identified.
The first obstacle was the intense market concentration, with the
energy market dominated by incumbents with very few new entrants.
The gas incumbents tend to control imports and/or domestic produc-
tion of gas, whereas electricity incumbents control generation as-
sets. 58 Against the background of the structured opening up of en-
ergy markets the EC Commission has used the competition provi-
sions to regulate the processes and to ensure that dominant firms do
not enhance their market strength. For example, in Portugal electric-
ity markets are open to competition but gas markets are moving at a
slower pace. Under the Second Gas Directive Portugal benefits from
a derogation that allows it to begin gas liberalisation at the later date
of 2007 for the opening up of the natural gas to power generators,
the gas market for non-residential customers by 2009 and the date of
2010 set for residential customers. On December 9, 2004 the EC
Commission declared the joint acquisition of Gas de Portugal (GDP)
(the incumbent Portuguese gas undertaking) by Energias de Portugal
(EDP) (the incumbent electricity undertaking) and Eni SpA, an Ital-
ian energy undertaking, to be incompatible with the common market,
pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Merger Regulation. 59 Despite com-
mitments undertaken by the parties, which were made at a very late
stage in the proceedings, the EC Commission concluded that the
proposed concentration would strengthen EDP's dominant position
on the electricity markets in Portugal, as well as EDP's dominant
57. Commission Communication on the Functioning of the Internal Market in
Electricity and Gas, COM (2005) 68 final (Jan. 10, 2007).
58. Press Release, Greenpeace, Whose Power is it Anyway? (Apr. 27, 2005).
The report analyzes the market shares of Europe's 10 largest electricity utilities
(EdF, E.on, RWE, ENEL, Vattenfall, Electrabel, EnBW, Endesa, Iberdrola and
British Energy) and argues that the liberalization process has worked in favour of
these large established utilities, as demonstrated by the wave of takeovers that
ensued after the opening of the market. Thus new, "green" utilities have little
chance to compete on an equal footing as the "Big 10" have enough influence in
the sector to control prices, especially in the electricity sector.
59. Case No. COMP/M.3440 - ENIEDP/GDP. For a wider discussion of the
limitations of the Merger rules in combating the problems created by "national
champions," see Andrew Scott, National Champions and the Two-thirds Rule in
EC Merger Control, (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia,
Working Paper 06-6, 2006), available at http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/pub-
licfiles/workingpapers/CCP06-6.pdf.
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positions on the Portuguese gas markets from the date these markets
were opened up to competition, leading to the situation where com-
petition would be significantly impeded in a substantial part of the
Common Market. EDP challenged the EC Commission's decision
under the fast track procedure of the Court of First Instance (CFI).
The CFI dismissed the challenge. The CFI confirmed the way in
which the EC Commission assesses remedies by examining, first,
competition concerns raised by the concentration, and then the
commitments offered in relation to these concerns. The EC Commis-
sion could not within the time constraints imposed by the Merger
Regulation recommence its assessment of the merger in the light of
any commitments made. This would appear to be seeing the com-
mitments as a fresh notification. Such an approach would be in con-
flict with the requirement of speedy decisions that characterises the
aims of the Merger Regulation. In relation to the substance of the
challenge the CFI considered that the EC Commission had not erred
in law when it concluded that the concentration would strengthen
EDP's dominant position.
60
A second obstacle to liberalisation is the vertical foreclosure
caused by the vertically integrated incumbents acting at different
levels of the supply chain, from wholesale to distribution of energy
products. Long-term contracts have posed problems for the state aid
rules and the lack of liquidity make access difficult for new entrants
to the energy market. One problem which emerged from the open-
ing-up of the gas sector to competition was the risk of foreclosure of
the downstream market through long-term gas supply contracts be-
tween traditional suppliers and distribution companies and the indus-
trial and commercial users. Long-term contracts inhibit consumer
choice by preventing consumers from switching to alternative sup-
pliers.
As a third obstacle the EC Commission found that there was a lack
of market integration in Europe. The gas and electricity markets re-
main largely national. New entrants have difficulty in gaining access
to what are perceived to be inadequate transmission systems. The EC
Commission found an endemic lack of transparency in the energy
markets. There was, for example, a lack of information on capacity
available on gas networks and the wholesale electricity market, with
data being shared with affiliates, putting new entrants at a disadvan-
60. Case T-87/05, EDP v. Commission, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3745.
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tage. This lack of information undermines confidence and prevents
informed choices from being made by potential entrants to the mar-
ket.
Finally, the EC Commission found that prices had increased dra-
matically since liberalisation and questioned whether there was anti-
competitive behaviour on the market. In the gas sector the EC Com-
mission noted that long-term gas supply contracts traditionally link
prices to oil or oil derivatives but do not react to changes in supply
or demand. In the electricity sector consumers had alleged that prices
on spot and forward wholesale markets do not result from fair com-
petition.
In addition to commencing infringement actions against the Mem-
ber States, 6 1 the EC Commission used competition law powers to
conduct a series of dawn raids on gas companies in Germany, 62 It-
aly, France, Belgium and Austria 63 and electricity companies in
Hungary.
64
Both the energy and gas markets display high levels of concentra-
tion, but there are differences in the different stages of liberalisation
of each sector and different production structures. The sectors are
interconnected since gas is increasingly used as a primary fuel for
electricity generation. In the electricity sector the inquiry focuses
upon price formation mechanisms on the electricity wholesale mar-
kets, electricity generation and supply and factors determining gen-
erators' dispatching and bidding strategies. A special focus is di-
rected at the issue whether electricity generators possess significant
market power and can influence electricity wholesale prices. A fur-
ther issue is the existence of entry barriers and barriers to cross-
border flows, for example arising from long-term supply agreements
61. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia and the
United Kingdom.
62. A second wave of dawn raids, unconnected to the first wave, took place
involving German electricity undertakings in Dec. 2006. Memorandum from the
European Commission, Competition: Commission has carried out inspections in
the German electricity sector, Memo/06/483 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/483&format
=HTML&aged= 1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
63. The EC Commission believes the companies may be restricting access to
infrastructure and dividing markets.
64. The focus is upon long-term power purchase agreements (which are also
the subject of a state aid investigation) and import contracts.
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in certain Member States and the legal and operational regimes for
the inter-connectors that link national electricity grids. In the gas
sector the inquiry focuses on long-term import contracts, swap
agreements and barriers to cross-border flows of gas. The balancing
requirements for gas network users and gas storage are also being
investigated, alongside downstream long-term contracts and the ef-
fects they may have on switching costs and market entry.
A third package of legislative proposals was adopted by the Com-
mission on 19 September 2007.65 The package promotes sustainabil-
ity by stimulating energy efficiency and guaranteeing that even
smaller companies, for instance those that invest in renewable en-
ergy, have access to the energy market. A competitive market will
also ensure greater security of supply, by improving the conditions
for investments in power plants and transmission networks, and thus
help avoid interruptions in power or gas supplies. Guarantees of fair
competition with third country companies are also strengthened.
To make the Internal Market work for all consumers whether large
or small, and to help the EU achieve more secure, competitive and
sustainable energy, the Commission is proposing a number of meas-
ures to complement the existing rules. First, the separation of pro-
duction and supply from transmission networks: Network ownership
and operation should be "unbundled." This refers to the separation
between the network operation of electricity and gas from supply
and generation activities. The proposals make it clear that the Com-
mission's preferred option in this respect is ownership unbundling: a
single company can no longer own both transmission and be occu-
pied in energy production or supply activities. This may prove prob-
lematic from a legal perspective since it is not entirely evident what
sort of legal powers or competence could be used to demand unbun-
dling. In addition, the Commission proposes a second option, the
"independent system operator" which makes it possible for existing
65. Press Release, European Commission, Energizing Europe: A real market
with secure supply (Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/elec-
tricity/package 2007/index en.htm. To date the electricity proposals comprise a
set of Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity (COM (2007) 528 final
(Jun. 26, 2003)) which are in the form of a proposal for a Directive and a proposal
for a Regulation on Cross-Border Exchanges in Electricity (COM (2007) 531 final
(Sep. 19, 2007)). The Gas proposals comprise a set of Common Rules for the In-
ternal Market in Natural Gas (COM (2007) 529 final(Sep. 19, 2007)) and a pro-
posal for a Regulation on Access Conditions to the Gas Transmission Network
(COM (2007) 532 final (Sep. 19, 2007)).
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vertically integrated companies to retain network ownership, but
provided that the assets are actually operated by a company or body
completely independent from it. Either one of these options will cre-
ate new incentives for companies to invest in new infrastructure,
inter-connection capacity and new generation capacity, thereby
avoiding black-outs and unnecessary price surges.
Secondly, the Commission recognizes the strategic importance of
Energy Policy. Therefore the package contains safeguards to ensure
that in the event that companies from third countries wish to acquire
a significant interest or even control over an EU network, they will
have to demonstrably and unequivocally comply with the same un-
bundling requirements as EU companies. The Commission can in-
tervene where a purchaser cannot demonstrate both its direct and
indirect independence from supply and generation activities.
A third idea is to facilitate cross-border energy trade: The Com-
mission proposes to establish an Agency for the cooperation of Na-
tional Energy Regulators, with binding decision powers, to comple-
ment National Regulators. This will ensure the proper handling of
cross-border cases and enable the EU to develop a real European
network working as one single grid, promoting diversity and security
of supply. To complement this aim is the creation of more effective
national regulators: the Commission proposes measures to
strengthen and guarantee the independence of national regulators in
Member States.
A fourth aim is to promote cross border collaboration and invest-
ment: The Commission proposes a new European Network for
Transmission System Operators. EU grid operators would cooperate
and develop common commercial and technical codes and security
standards, as well as plan and coordinate the investments needed at
EU level. This would also ease cross border trade and create a more
level playing field for operators.
A fifth aim is to secure greater transparency: this involves steps to
improve market transparency on network operation and supply will
guarantee equal access to information, make pricing more transpar-
ent, increase trust in the market and help avoid market manipulation.
Finally, there is the aim of increased solidarity: by bringing na-
tional markets closer together, the Commission foresees more poten-
tial for Member States to assist one another in the face of energy
supply threats.
Customers will also benefit from a new Energy Customers' Charter
to be launched in 2008. This will include measures to address fuel
poverty, information for customers to choose a supplier and supply
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options, actions to lower red tape when changing energy suppliers
and to protect citizens from unfair selling practises. A separate in-
formation campaign will inform customers of their rights.
The proposed package of measures was anticipated in the Com-
mission's Energy Policy for Europe which was endorsed by the
European Council in March 2007. This set out the need for the EU to
draw up a new energy path towards a more secure, sustainable and
low-carbon economy, for the benefit of all citizens. Fully competi-
tive markets are an essential pre-requisite to reaching this goal. From
1 July 2007, citizens across the EU already have a right to choose
their supplier. The new package aims to ensure that all suppliers ful-
fil high standards of service, sustainability and security. Germany, in
particular has been critical of the measures.
1II. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES FOR THE EU
The Kyoto Protocol 2001 to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, was ap-
proved by the EU in April 2002.66 The EU committed to a higher
target of an 8% reduction in annual greenhouse gas emissions across
the EU. The Member States agreed to distribute the target in what is
known as the EU "bubble." So, for example, Denmark and Germany
are to cut their emissions by 21% while, at the other end of the scale
Greece can actually increase emissions by 27% and Portugal by
25%. The prime solutions posed for meeting the Kyoto challenge are
energy conservation and the use of renewable energy sources. The
use of renewables has also be linked to a wider issue of finding a
sustainable energy solution to the rising global population demands
for energy and the gradual exhaustion of fossil fuels (especially oil
and gas) predicted by the end of this century.
At this time the EU was not a significant leader in research and de-
velopment in renewable energy and lagged behind the United States
in this field. Germany was the largest contributor to research and
development, followed by Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. These Member States did however, have a
66. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 11, 1997. The Kyoto Protocol set a target of 5.2%
compared with 1990 levels by the period 2008-2010 in the first commitment pe-
riod.
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more diversified approach to research and development of renewable
energy than the US and Japan, with approximately one third for
photo-voltaics, one quarter for wind energy and one-quarter for bio-
energy. The US and Japan tended to focus upon photo-voltaics.
Despite the EU framework that has been adopted since the White
Paper, renewable energy policy in the EU is still very much a na-
tional policy. In some Member States, especially in southern Europe,
research and development of renewables is still very under-
developed.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROMOTION OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY
In a White Paper on Renewable Sources of Energy, the EC Com-
mission suggested that by 2010 the share of primary energy pro-
duced from renewables should be increased from 6% to 12% and
this indicative target was approved by the Council Resolution in
1998. 67 The Commission also published a Proposal on the Promo-
tion of Electricity from RES. The main piece of legislation to emerge
was a Framework Directive, the Renewables Directive of 2001 68
using Article 175(1) EC as its legal base. To summarise, the main
points of the Directive are to describe "renewable energy sources" as
renewable non-fossil - wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal, hydro-
power, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and bio-
gases. Member States commit to specific targets for renewable en-
ergy. They must introduce accurate and reliable certification of green
electricity to ensure guaranteed access to green electricity and ensure
that the calculation of costs for connecting new producers of green
electricity to the grid is transparent and non-discriminatory. Member
States are required to establish individual RES-E targets that are
consistent with reaching the Commission's target of 21% indicative
share of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in total
EU electricity consumption by 2010.
Member States are required to report to the Commission towards
their green electricity consumption targets every two years. The
Commission must report via a Communication on how the national
67. 1998 O.J. (C 198) 1.
68. Council Directive 2001/77, 2001 O.J. (L 283) 33 (on the promotion of
energy from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market).
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schemes are applied in practice and how cost-effective they are in
promoting renewable energy sources. The EU common policy con-
sists of supporting technology research and development, setting
medium and long-term targets and providing boundary conditions,
for example, a system of guarantees of origin.
A major weakness has been the lack of incentives for market pene-
tration of renewable energy. But there is also a lack of co-ordination,
for example, there is a strong focus on wind energy and solar energy
at the expense of under-development of bio-energy policies. A fairly
recent Eurobarometer poll concluded that a majority of EU citizens
(47%) would prefer the EU to take decisions at the EU level to meet
the challenges of energy supply security, growing energy consump-
tion and climate change.
69
The EU Sustainable Development Strategy has raised the stakes
even higher. For example, by 2010 12% of energy consumption, on
average, and 21% of electricity consumption, as a common but dif-
ferentiated target, should be met by renewable sources with the
Member States considering raising their share to 15% by 2015.70 It
is difficult for the EU to create an effective enforcement mechanism
for the reaching of targets. The soft law processes rely on a "naming,
shaming and faming" peer group pressure approach, with very little
role to play for sanctions.71
A. A New Energy Policy for Europe
On 10 January 2007 the Commission made proposals for a new
Energy Policy for Europe. These included a renewable energy road-
map proposing a binding 20% target for the overall share of renew-
able energy in 2020; the effort to be shared in an appropriate way
between Member States; a binding 10% target for the share of biofu-
els in petrol and diesel in each Member State in 2020, to be accom-
panied by the introduction of a sustainability scheme for biofuels. 72
69. Press Release, supra note 6.
70. See Council of the European Union, Review of the EU Sustainable Devel-
opment Strategy, 10917/06 (adopted June 16, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/sustainable/docs/renewed eu sds en.pdf.
71. See Erika Szyszczak, Experimental Governance: The Open Method of
Coordination, 12 EUR. L. J. 486 (2006).
72. Communication From the Commission to the European Council and the
European Parliament An Energy Policy for Europe, COM (2007) 1 final (Oct. 1,
2007).
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The Commission is now drafting proposals to incorporate these
targets into legislation, taking into account the views of stakeholders
as expressed in the 2006 consultation exercises on heating and cool-
ing and biofuels and the recent consultation exercise on administra-
tive obstacles to the increased use of renewable energy in electricity
generation.
The Commission is aiming for a longer term target for renewable
energy. In 1997, the European Union started working towards a
target of a 12% share of renewable energy in its overall mix by 2010,
a doubling of 1997 levels. Since then, renewable energy production
has increased by 55%. Nevertheless the EU is set to fall short of its
target. The share of renewable energy is unlikely to exceed 10% by
2010. The main reasons for the failure to reach the agreed targets for
renewable energy are the higher costs of renewable energy sources
compared to "traditional" energy sources and the lack of a coherent
and effective policy framework throughout the EU and a stable long-
term vision. As a result, only a limited number of Member States
have made serious progress in this area and the critical mass has not
been reached to shift niche renewables production into the
mainstream. The EU needs a step change to provide a credible long
term vision of the future of renewable energy in the EU, building on
the existing instruments, notably the renewable Electricity Directive.
This is essential to realize present targets and trigger further
investment, innovation and jobs.
The challenge for a renewable energy policy is to find the right
balance between installing large scale renewable energy capacity
today, and waiting until research lowers their cost tomorrow.
Finding the right balance means taking a number of factors into
account. Firstly, using renewable energy today is generally more
expensive than using hydrocarbons, (but the gap is narrowing -
particularly when the costs of climate change are factored in).
Economies of scale can reduce the costs for renewables, but this
needs major investment today. Secondly, renewable energy helps to
improve the EU's security of energy supply by increasing the share
of domestically produced energy, diversifying the fuel mix and the
sources of energy imports and increasing the proportion of energy
from politically stable regions as well as creating new jobs in
Europe. Thirdly, renewable energies emit few or no greenhouse
gases, and most of them bring significant air quality benefits. In the
light of the information received during the public consultation and
the impact assessment, the Commission proposes in its Renewable
Energy Roadmap a binding target of increasing the level of
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renewable energy in the EU's overall mix from less than 7% today to
20% by 2020. Targets beyond 2020 would be assessed in the light of
technological progress. Meeting the 20% target will require a
massive growth in all three renewable energy sectors: electricity,
biofuels and heating and cooling. But in all sectors, the policy
frameworks set up in particular Member States have achieved results
which show how this is possible. Renewables have the potential to
provide around a third of EU electricity by 2020. Wind power
provides approximately 20% of electricity needs in Denmark, today,
as well as 8% in Spain and 6% in Germany. Costs in other new
technologies - photovoltaic, solar thermal power, and wave and tide,
are projected to decrease from currently high levels. In the heating
and cooling sector, progress will have to come from a number of
technologies. Sweden, for example, has over 185,000 installed
geothermal heat pumps. Germany and Austrian have led the way on
solar heating. If other Member States matched these levels, the share
of renewable energy in heating and cooling would jump by 50%. As
for biofuels, Sweden has already achieved a market share of 4% of
the petrol market for bioethanol, and Germany is the world leader for
bio-diesel, with 6% of the diesel market. Biofuels could make up to
14% of transport fuels by 2020. This 20% target is ambitious and
will require major efforts by all Member States.
The contribution of each Member State to achieving the Union's
target will need to take into account different national circumstances
and starting points, including the nature of their energy mix. Member
States should have the flexibility to promote the renewable energies
most suited to their specific potential and priorities. The way in
which Member States will meet their targets should be set out in
National Action Plans to be notified to the Commission. The Plans
should contain sectoral targets and measures consistent with
achieving the agreed overall national targets. In practice, in
implementing their Plans, Member States will need to set their own
specific objectives for electricity, biofuels, heating and cooling.
These would be verified by the Commission to ensure that the
overall target is being met. The Commission will set out this
architecture in a new renewable energy legislative package in 2007.
A particular feature of this framework is the need for a minimum
and coordinated development of biofuels throughout the EU. While
biofuels are today and in the near future more expensive than other
forms of renewable energy, over the next 15 years they are the only
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way to significantly reduce oil dependence in the transport sector. In
its Renewable Energy Roadmap 73 and Biofuels Progress Report74
the Commission therefore proposes to set a binding minimum target
for biofuels of 10% of vehicle fuel by 2020 and to ensure that the
biofuels used are sustainable in nature, inside and outside the EU.
The EU should engage third countries and their producers to achieve
this. In addition, the 2007 renewables legislative package will
include specific measures to facilitate the market penetration of both
biofuels and heating and cooling from renewables.
The Commission will also continue and intensify the use of
renewable energy through other policies and flanking measures with
the aim of creating a real internal market for renewable energy in the
EU. To achieve a 20% share for renewable energy will result in an
additional average annual cost of approximately E 18 billion -
around 6% extra on the EU's total expected energy import bill in
2020. But this assumes oil prices of $ 48/barrel by 2020. If these
rose to $ 78/barrel, the average annual cost would fall to E 10.6
billion. If a carbon price of more than E 20 is factored in, the 20%
would cost practically no more than relying on "traditional" energy
sources, but create many jobs in Europe and develop new,
technology driven European companies.
V. CONSTRAINTS ON THE MEMBER STATES
A. Compatibility with the State Aid Rules
One of the main ways in which Member States can promote and
encourage renewable energy sources is through the use of subsidies,
known as State Aids in the EU. State aid has long been a sensitive
issue in the EU and the Commission and the Member States have
accepted that intelligent use of State Aid may be beneficial in meet-
ing Community objectives contained in the EC Treaty as well as the
Lisbon goals.75 The use of less and better targeted aid is one policy
line being pursued as part of the Lisbon Agenda. From the The State
73. Commission Communication on the Renewable Energy Road Map, Re-
newable Energies in the 21St Century: Building a More-Sustainable Future, COM
(2006) 848 final (Oct. 1, 2007).
74. Commission Communication, Biofuels Progress Report, COM (2006) 845
final (Oct. 1, 2007).
75. See SZYSZCZAK, supra note 7.
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Aid Action Plan,76 the Commission built upon existing practice by
formalising a balancing test which is applied to the design of the
State Aid rules as well as assessing individual cases. The test at-
tempts to balance out the positive and negative effects of State Aid
when looking at individual exemptions. State Aid for environmental
objectives has also been addressed through Commission soft law
processes. The 1994 Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Pro-
tection were replaced in 2001. They apply to all sectors, even those
sectors which have sector specific state aid rules, but they do not
affect the specific rules relating to de minimis. Their role is to pro-
vide ex ante guidance to the Member States when deciding
"whether, and under what conditions, state aid may be regarded as
necessary to ensure environmental protection and sustainable devel-
opment without having disproportionate effects on competition and
economic growth." The Guidelines do not apply to stranded costs
but are essentially concerned with investment aid and operating aid
to promote renewable energy sources.
Investment aid must be strictly necessary to attain environmental
objectives but spending on technology transfer is allowed, for exam-
ple, acquisition of operating licences, patented know-how could
qualify. Operating aid is more complicated. There are different rules
depending upon whether the aid is to promote waste management
and energy saving; the aid is to promote the combined production of
electric power and heat; the aid is to be in the form of tax reductions
or exemptions; or the aid is for renewable energy sources where spe-
cial treatment applies to help these sources compete against conven-
tional sources. Operating aid may be justified to cover the difference
between the cost of producing energy from renewable sources and
the market price of that energy. Member States may grant aid in only
three situations.
The Guidelines expired in 2007. On 1 0 th May 2007 the Commis-
sion issued a Preliminary Draft of a Staff Paper (which is a Consulta-
tive Document) entitled Community Guidelines for State Aid for En-
76. Commission Communication, State Aid Action Plan: Less and Better Tar-
geted State Aid. A Road Map for State Aid Reform 2005-2009, COM (2005) 107
final (June 7, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/
state aid/reform/saap en.pdf.
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vironmental Protection.77  However, the Commission embarked
upon a modernisation and consolidation of the State Aid rules in
2005 and environmental issues have also been subsumed into the
draft State Aid Block Exemption Regulation.78
The most positive ruling of the European Courts in support of
State measures to encourage the use of renewable energy came in an
Article 234 EC ruling in Preussen Elecktra.79 The case concerns
both the Internal Market and the State Aid rules. The case concerned
a German law (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz) that placed an obligation
on energy providers to source a proportion of their supplies from
local renewable energy installations. The German utility companies
were not happy with the feed-in schemes developed in Germany
from 1998-2000, and one way of challenging them was to claim that
the feed-in schemes were contrary to the EU State Aid rules. The
Court held that there was no State Aid present in the German
scheme. This was because consumers paid for the electricity and
therefore there was no transfer of State funds which benefited indi-
vidual firms.
On the Internal Market rules the Court appears to indicate support
for policies which promote renewable energy. The Court found that
there was discrimination but that the German measure could be justi-
fied on environmental grounds. The Court's reasoning in the case
can be criticised because Article 30 EC (which is the basis for dero-
gations from the free movement provisions) does not contain an ex-
plicit protection of the environment provision. A derogation which
satisfies the principle of proportionality can be found in the clause
which refers to measures which protect the health and life of hu-
mans, animals and plants. Under the Cassis principle, the protection
of the environment has become one of the accepted mandatory re-
quirements, 80 but the Cassis principle should, strictu sensu apply
only to indistinctly applicable measures. The Opinion of AG Jacobs'
77. Staff Paper, Preliminary Draft, Community Guidelines for State Aid for
Environmental Protection (May 10, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state-aid/reform/guidelinesenvironment_e
n.pdf.
78. Draft Commission Regulation on Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty,
2007 O.J. (C 210) 10, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
site/en/oj/2007/c_210/c_21020070908en00140040.pdf.
79. Case C-379/98, Preussen Elektra v. Schleswang, 2001 E.C.R. 1-2099.
80. Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
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casts some light on the problem. He argued that limiting the ground
of protection of the environment to indistinctly applicable measures:
"... national measures for the protection of the environ-
ment are inherently liable to differentiate on the basis of
the nature and origin of the cause of harm, and are there-
fore liable to be found to be discriminatory, precisely be-
cause they are based on such accepted principles as "en-
vironmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
source" (Article 130r(2) EC). Where such measures nec-
essarily have a discriminatory impact of that kind, the
possibility that they mat be justified should not be ex-
cluded."
The Court's ruling left unanswered the effect of the German trade
of green electricity to other Member States since the buying-in obli-
gation was limited to green electricity produced in Germany. Was
this an import-restriction? Germany justified the scheme as increas-
ing the supply security from national renewable sources, arguing this
is a justifiable derogation in free movement of goods. It also referred
to Article 6 EC that environmental protection is a goal in all Com-
munity policies, including trade between Member States.
B. Competition Law
Within EU competition (anti-trust) law there is debate as to how
far non-economic values are taken into account in making and apply-
ing Community law and policy. The Commission has addressed con-
sumer welfare and non-economic considerations in its assessment of
agreements and other forms of co-ordination which may have anti-
competitive effects under Article 81 EC. The EC Treaty itself de-
mands that Community-based policies should be taken into account
in decision-making. Environmental protection in Article 6 EC is one
of these policies. 8' Thus, in the Guidelines on Horizontal Agree-
ments the Commission states that it will exempt agreements under
Article 81(3) EC which reduce environmental pressure provided that
the net contribution to the improvement of the environmental situa-
81. EC Treaty, supra note 14 at art. 6; see also Id. at arts. 127(2) (employ-
ment), 151(4) (culture), 152(1) (health), 153(2) (consumer protection), 157(3)
(industrial policy), and 159 (economic and social cohesion).
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tion overall outweighs increased costs. 82 Some examples of this pol-
icy can be seen in CECED when the Commission exempted an
agreement between washing machine manufacturers which phased
out washing machines which had a high electricity consumption. The
improved environmental conditions outweighed the anti-competitive
effects of the agreement. In an article in the 2002 Competition Policy
Newsletter, two comfort letters are discussed where the Commission
reveals it will not pursue agreements where the benefits which the
society at large derives from the agreement as well as the benefits for
individual consumers are a factor. 83
In DSD84 the Commission granted an individual exemption under
Article 81(3) EC because an agreement gave direct practical effect to
environmental objectives set out in Directive 94/62 on Packaging
and Packaging Waste. 85 The Commission has encouraged voluntary
agreements which pursue environmental objectives. 86 However, in
analysing the reasons given for clearing or exempting certain agree-
ments efficiency gains, for example lower production costs, the use
of new technology and increased production capacity are also impor-
tant factors, alongside the environmental objectives.8 7 Since the de-
centralisation of the enforcement of competition law in Regulation
1/2003 the Commission has issued conflicting guidance, stating that
efficiencies are the sole factor in applying Article 81(3) EC.88
82. Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Applicability ofArticle 81 of the EC
Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 3) 2, 179.
83. Manuel Martinez Lopez, Commission Confirms Its Policy Line in Respect
of Horizontal Agreements on Energy Efficiency of Domestic Appliances, 1
COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSLETTER 50, 52 (2002).
84. 2001 O.J. (L 319) 1, 143-45.
85. 1994 O.J. (L 365) 5.
86. Council Decision 2179/98m art. 3(1)(f), 1998 O.J. (L275) 1; Commission
Communication, supra note 13.
87. Exxon-Shell, 1994 O.J. (L 144) 21, 67; Philips-Osram, 1994 O.J. (L 378)
37, 7 25-26.
88. Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97; see Gerwin Van Gerven, The Application of Article
81 in the New Europe, in FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 429 (Barry Hawk, ed., Juris 2003).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The new energy policy, unwrapped in 2007, is a fascinating case
study revealing how new forms of economic governance are being
used to pull together what were once flanking (or horizontal) policies
of the EU, to turn them into a mainstream, and yes, I dare say this to
an American audience - a fundamental, constitutional EU policy.
The new governance techniques are novel in that they set binding
targets for the Member States. How these will been enforced is not
addressed. Alongside the usual "naming, faming and shaming" tech-
niques currently deployed in new forms of economic governance the
Commission will be able to use its normal enforcement powers, us-
ing infringement actions under Article 288 EC. Will this really co-
erce Member States, who maybe do not have the resources (both
physical and financial) to create new forms of renewable energy?
Now energy, through the use of the Lisbon Process, has emerged as
a mainstream policy. This policy brings a new set of values to the
balance, which is maintained in European integration between eco-
nomic and social aims, with the core Internal Market rules and Com-
petition policy rules adapted to accommodate the tensions that this
new policy area brings.

